EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN: STRAIGHT FROM THE HORSES’ MOUTH (Susan Kelley)

Somebody once said something to me about how bad pleadings can result in bad law being rendered.  But nobody said anything about clear, concise claims of racketeering, fraud on the court, document fraud, bankruptcy fraud, and failure to follow the PSA would result in a judge taking it upon herself to pull rulings our of her arse in her extrajurisdictional rant to protect the foreclosure-mill attorneys she sits and hob-nobs with on the Bankruptcy CLE panels.  This posting should not be construed as a personal or ad-hominem attack on the judge, the appellate judge, the Department of Justice, or the law firms used by Wells Fargo. It should, however, illustrate the lengths that these parties will go to silence and intimidate debtors and their attorneys who bring these acts of fraud to the attention of the court.  If we didn’t do that, it would be misprision of a felony.  At the outset of the case the judge declared that the claims made were, and I quote, “voluminous and serious”.  At that point, the decision was made to violate mine and my spouses’ constitutional right to an evidentiary hearing and make sure that THERE WOULD BE NO JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS.  What was deemed to be important is that the bank attorneys would not be held responsible for any of their fraudulent filings.

And back to that bad law thing.  In the following quotes that are already being used throughout the 7th Circuit verbatim (just like the phrases used by judges that travel between county courts in a matter of hours) I will try to illustrate the absurdity of what these judges read into pleadings that were actually VERY CLEAR.

In re Rinaldi, 487 BR 516 – Bankr. Court, ED Wisconsin 2013

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How this document has been cited

—finding that Debtor lacked standing to challenge mortgage assignment because borrower was not party to or third-party beneficiary of pooling and servicing agreement
– in In re Schmid, 2013 and 2 similar citations
Contrast that with the 9th Circuit (Glaski) and the fact that the PSA was cited as evidence of the transfer and ownership of the note and mortgage.  The foreclosure was obtained with a note lacking an indorsement of any kind, and still payable to Wells Fargo, although the foreclosure was brought in the name of HSBC BANK, U.S.A., N.A. AS TRUSTEE.  The other interesting thing is that this judge had NOT ONE, NOT TWO, BUT THREE ASSIGNMENTS OF MORTGAGE IN FRONT OF HER.  Assignment #1 was recorded FOURTEEN MONTHS AFTER THE FILING OF THE FORECLOSURE ACTION (oops, that one’s no good), Assignment #2 showed up for the first time ever in the Proof of Claim #6 alleging to be from 2005, and Assignment #3 was recorded AFTER THE BANKRUPTCY WAS FILED.  
 
Citing recent decisions from the US District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Bou-Matic contends that Tilstra’s claim for intentional interference with contract is barred by the statute of limitations for intentional torts, Wis. Stat. § 893.57.
– in Tilstra v. Bou-Matic, LLC, 2014 and one similar citation
These decisions HAD TO BE RECENT because they fly in the face of REASONABLE CASE LAW ALREADY ON THE BOOKS.  Let me ask a simple question: if the crimes are being committed in the very bankruptcy case before the court, how can the statute of limitations be expired?  The horse and the stable master (Stadtmueller) stated that our claims were for the bogus foreclosure action.  NO! NO! NO! NO! NO!  THE RICO CLAIMS WERE FOR THE DOCUMENTS USED IN THE BANKRUPTCY CASE TOO, DUMMY!
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been applied to bar collateral attacks on judgments entered in state-court foreclosure proceedings.
– in In re Schmid, 2013 and one similar citation
“Oh, Suzanna, don’t you cry for me…..”  MS. Schmid lost her house to foreclosure because the BANK REFUSED HER PAYMENTS, creating the alleged default. Her case was a sham pleading from the start with another plaintiff and no note.  This gal had put $100,000 down (30%) on her purchase transaction.  The horse-feather-filled argument in Judge Kelley’s inane ruling against me was that the VACATED FORECLOSURE SOMEHOW CREATED SOME KIND OF RES JUDICATA TO TOTALLY DIFFERENT ISSUES RAISED IN THE BANKRUPTCY ADVERSARY ACTION, unrelated to the  foreclosure conducted two years earlier, and yes it’s still vacated!  
in In re Rinaldi, a bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy court stated that the debtor’s insinuation (that insinuation was evidenced with the unindorsed note, making two copies that were both deemed authentic by this dummy) that the creditor endorsed the note after the foreclosure proceeding began was irrelevant to that proceeding because there was no requirement that an endorsement be dated.
– in AnchorBANK, FSB v. BOGENSCHNEIDER, 2014 and one similar citation
This was clearly addressed in Dow Family Trust v. PHH Mortgage, which was decided during our case and cited to the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals: ” ¶10 The (Wisconsin) court of appeals, however, found that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to PHH because PHH failed to show that it could enforce the note. Dow Family, LLC, 350 Wis. 2d 411, ¶24. Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that PHH’s documentation at summary judgment did not show that it held an authenticated copy of the note in question. Id. Furthermore, the court of appeals held that PHH’s arguments as to whether the note could be considered self-authenticating o. 2013AP221 6 were undeveloped, and it declined to address those arguments. Id., ¶22. Therefore, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for trial on the issue of PHH’s ability to enforce the note in question.3 Id., ¶24.
The point is well taken that an unrecorded mortgage and a note lacking endorsement does not a valid foreclosure make!!!  Even the BK Appellate court and the  corrupt 7th Circuit ignored Dow.
The only relationship the allegedly fraudulent assignment bears to the Debtors’ bankruptcy case is that the Debtors have filed bankruptcy, and presumably, any money damages awarded would increase the funds in the Debtors’ estate
– in In re Laddusire, 2013 and one similar citation
This poor gal got a raw deal in the Court.  But our case involved, again, THREE ASSIGNMENTS OF MORTGAGE before the court.  Susan Kelley stated that ONE OF THOSE THREE MUST BE GOOD, SO IT’S A NON-ISSUE.  THIS FOLLOWED HER STATEMENT THAT THE TRUST, OR ANY SIMILARLY NAMED TRUST, HAD A RIGHT TO FORECLOSE.   WHAT????
Likewise, “Stern reaffirmed that bankruptcy courts have the authority to restructure the debtor-creditor relationship and determine `creditors’ hierarchically ordered claims to a pro rata share of the bankruptcy res.'”
– in In re Schmid, 2013 and one similar citation
In other words, she was going to make sure the BANK GOT THE TITLE TO THE HOUSE NO MATTER WHO WAS CLAIMING THE RIGHT TO FORECLOSE!
As long as the injury complained of in federal court is “inextricably intertwined” with the state-court judgment, the doctrine applies.
THIS IS ANOTHER INTENTION MISCONSTRUCTION OF THE PLEADINGS!  THE INJURY WAS THAT THE LAW FIRM WAS FABRICATING AND FORGING DOCUMENTS WILLY-NILLY EVERY TIME AN OBECTION TO THE FIRST=PROFFERED NOTES AND ASSIGNMENTS WERE SHOWN TO BE FRAUDULENT.
Further, the only connection between the State Court Action and the bankruptcy proceeding is the fact the Debtor filed bankruptcy, and if it is determined there was not a partnership, that there may be property of the estate subject to administration.
THE ONLY CONNECTION TO THE FORECLOSURE AND THE BANKRUPTCY IS THAT ALL THE DOCUMENTS USED IN THE BANKRUPTCY WERE ALTERED TO SUBMIT TO THE BANKRUPTCY COURT!
The claims of forgery or fraud, however, do not stem from the bankruptcy itself, nor will such claims necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process.
HOW FREAKING BLIND CAN SHE BE? THREE ASSIGNMENTS OF MORTGAGE AND TWO COPIES OF THE NOTE AND THERE IS NO FORGERY.  We specifically objected to the “Joan M. Mills” rubber stamped endorsement in blank, and Judge Kelley stated WE HAD NO RIGHT TO OBJECT TO THE ENDORSEMENT.  THAT IS THE BORROWERS ONLY LEGITIMATE DEFENSE TO AN ALTERED OR FORGED NOTE.  AND BANKRUPTCY COURT IS THE VENUE FOR A DEBTOR TO DEFEND AGAINST THE NOTE ON THAT PREMISE!!
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional in nature; its applicability must be determined before any other affirmative defense, including claim preclusion.”
AND IN THE END SHE STATES THAT ROOKER-FELDMAN DID NOT APPLY.
SO THE MORAL OF THE STORY IS THAT HERE IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN, YOU DON’T STAND A CHANCE AGAINST THE CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE THAT IS THE NATIONAL BANKS, THE LAW FIRMS, AND THE JUDICIARY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN WISCONSIN AND THE 7TH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS.
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